T
he primary characteristic of rational theory, exemplified by game theory, is the construction of a single perspective, known as the individual, rational viewpoint. From the beginning of the past century, the thesis has prevailed that reaching a broad consensus on each single rational perspective would end conflict (e.g., Popper, 1992 ). An example is the essay by Shearer and Gould (1999) , who claimed that it should be possible to practice science without disagreement. If reality, R, is constructed so that information is freely available and accessible to any and all, a single rational perspective would be possible. Then, disagreement between or within groups would be superfluous. And the social entanglement between agent actors and observers that characterizes jointly encoded social information (Arfi, in press ), once severed, could be reassembled to re-create group states. In fact, traditional social learning theory is predicated on the very ability to accumulate I, or knowledge K, independent of cognitive awareness that, we will argue, also makes it independent of social evolution. However, every child learns that two sides exist for every story. But as adults, we learn much more, that putting together two sides of a story before a jury can leave significant gaps. More interesting, similar gaps occur from the collapse of entanglement between particles into individual histories that cannot be reassembled to re-create the entangled state (Zeilinger, 1999) .
The social quantum model (SQM) encodes joint conjugate information (Lawless, Castelao, & Abubucker, 2000) . Conjugate variables are interdependent, reflecting the social behavior of actors and observers. Furthermore, individual cognitive maps of R superimpose with the maps constructed by others (Zlot, Stentz, Dias, & Thayer, 2002) . In this context, SQM helps us to better understand the value of argumentation theory in self-organization and social evolution; that is, constructive interference should lead to jointly shared I, or knowledge, and destructive interference should jointly motivate the need for continued debate or more exploration.
SQM considers agents as residing in different energy, E, states.
Although not yet analytical, from its qualitative perspective, SQM recognizes baseline states and agitated or higher E states (Lawless, 2001) . Lewin (1951) first suggested that stable interactions provide little information, I, where I = -∑p(x) ln p(x), to external witnesses. SQM predicts that disturbing a stable interaction, by raising the participants to a higher E level, generates I from "dissonance" in an individual, organization, or system observable to outsiders that can result in evolutionary change; for example, witnessing social turmoil after World War II led to qualitatively better social theories (Jones, 1998) , just as witnessing the turmoil of debate often leads to better justice in the courtroom (Freer & Perdue, 1996) or better science (Lawless & Castelao, 2001) .
Tools extend human capabilities. Dissonance as argumentation is a tool for the evolution of society. The more complex a tool, the more teamwork (coordination, communication, and cooperation) required to produce it (Ambrose, 2001) . But the more well defined a problem, the less I teamwork generates to outsiders, contradicting Nash (1950) and others that the solution of difficult problems depends on more cooperation (Lawless, Castelao, & Ballas, 2000) . Ill-defined problems (IDPs) require arguments to produce "a competition of ideas" to generate I and trial-and-error adaptations. Von Neumann (1961) , the founder of game theory, believed in the value of cooperation, but he also concluded that unlike physicists who were always willing to join a conflict over foundational ideas, mathematicians tended to avoid conflict, slowing the evolution of his discipline. Benardete (2002) indicated that traditional beliefs tend to support the reasoning of Socrates (the best educated should govern) but not his behavior (argument to seek truth). Based on a reworking of Habermas's (1985) proceduralism, argumentation is a discursive practice involving at least two agents, or a family resemblance among such practices, to coordinate action to achieve a mutually agreeable outcome or telos.
PHILOSOPHY AND ARGUMENTATION
As delineated by Wilber's (2000 Wilber's ( , 2001 ) "spectrum of consciousness" in his developmental model, genuine argument-not the informal debate on CNN-occurs if two or more agents operate at the moral-cognitive level of "vision-logic." Both magical and mythical levels of consciousness tend to hold tightly to beliefs, especially core or critical "in-group" beliefs, in establishing a sense of self. But with reasoning, the validity of a belief inherited from a culture can be ascertained by objectifying it in light of the many evidential procedures in any cultural context. This monological awareness can be momentarily expanded to a shared (jointly encoded) vision-logic by objectifying one's entire perspective, to compare it with another perspective under discussion. When agents share this objectification of both perspectives, authentic argument occurs.
SOCIAL SCIENCE COMPUTER REVIEW
But two culturally different agents remaining in mythic modes of awareness (e.g., one with a creationist ideology and the other an evolutionist ideology), unable to objectify their perspectives or acknowledge another's perspective in its own right, or unable to suspend dogmatically held beliefs, never engage in argument. For example, van Eeten (2002) wrote about controversies deadlocked after many years where policy makers, public managers, and stakeholders talk past each other, advancing arguments that although "true" in the eyes of one side are routinely rejected out of hand by other sides.
This has implications for Habermas's thesis. In light of Kant's regulative ideas of reason, the giving of reasons in Habermas's communicative action has been redescribed by McCarthy (1991) in a pragmatic-practical light: In argument, honoring the strongest reason regulates the discursive practice of argument. There is something right about this but also misleading, in lieu of Wilber's spectrum theory, which has a stronger predictive force that a shared vision-logic regulates the reasoning of all participants to achieve better argument.
We need to question Habermas's (1985) focus on telos of agreement to coordinate actions, thwarting violence on one hand and steering mechanisms of money and administrative power on the other, as the force deciding what is to be done. And his "learning experiences" within the event of argumentation are too vague and need deeper exploration: What happens or can happen during argument beyond the "exchange" of reasons? Another problem is that argument is seen for the most part as the exchange of propositions or strings of propositions, where the proposition, as a sentential holism, is the "atom" of meaning/sense/ truth, but the proposition, beyond its entombment in logical-positivistic analysis, is a discursive event in time that needs phenomenological exploration. From the post-Husserlian tradition of phenomenology, propositional meaning, or validity claims, is not closed logically by the producing-speaking subject-agent, but its meaning is opened up in the "inbetweensphere" of speech (Waldenfels, 1996) ; with reference to Merleau-Ponty's (1969) late philosophy of the flesh and Levinas's (1981) distinction between the saying and the said, the sense of a proposition or string of propositions is open, "demanding" from the other a response to "complete" its sense/meaning, which is not simply logical, or a mere matter of agreeing, but can be about the semantic references themselves. There is an open and ever shifting holism of propositions and utterances coming from both sides, located in the in-between sphere of the world's flesh, where not only the validity but the meaning of both agents'assertions are never closed, always changing as the discussion continues. This entails that the "what" of the discussion itself is opened and resignified in the course of interaction, and this is deeper than, prior to, the regulative idea of reason guiding the argument. Although the sense is never completed and closed, speaking places a demand on the other to listen and respond, to complete the sense of what is said.
These issues do not dismiss Habermas's theory in its broadest and deepest insights; it only means that the sense of the argument, what is being argued about and how this arguing occurs, is to be made more precise as the atoms are transformed amid the exchange of propositions themselves (e.g., the issue might begin on a topic, but its very sense might shift and transform by the end).
Even if it misses the force of Habermas's proceduralism (Benhabib, 1984 ), Lyotard's (1988) stress on the "differend" asks how can pragmatically different forms of rational argumentation, that is, different language games of reasoning, effectively mesh with each other? For example, what counts as a reason in one language game might not in another; it might be passed over in its status as a reason or even why it counts as a reason. This is not terminal because such divergent reasons are not closed but open "logics" that can transcend, changing into a learning process of the second order, each agent engaging in a different reasoning style while learning from one another about the other's language, discovering and inventing a Lawless, Schwartz / SOCIAL QUANTUM MODEL OF DISSONANCE 443 common procedure to move the argument forward; this happens explicitly and implicitly, without necessarily being thematized. Formal argument requires a shared vision-logic from the parties; otherwise, agents remain at the level of ideology (as on TV). If the deepest possible learning and claims of truth on oneself can occur, as Gadamer (1993) said, one must in dialogue of any kind, including argument, risk one's beliefs, one's worldview, and one's "I-sense" and identity. Hence, selfredescription, and possibly even the seeds of self-transformation (the distinction is from Wilber), for one or both agents, can readily happen in argument; the agents themselves can change. New forms of argumentation can emerge that overcome the differend of reasoning. While maintaining the Habermasian view, argument may lead to no resolution, no agreed on decision may emerge, but what can happen is an exercising and expansion of moral capacities of tolerance and compassion, self-transformations of identities and shifts in worldviews and in the possibilities of what can be done, increased skill at listening to and responding to the demands of the other's speech (which is valuable in all situations, not only for argumentation), and the invention of new styles of reasoning that transcend differences, bringing together and integrating previously disparate rationalities. Beyond the telos of Habermas's coordinating action, all of these are facets of the event of argumentation.
PHYSICS OF SELF-ORGANIZED DECISION MAKING AND EVOLUTION
To supplant anarchy with rational interactions, structures are self-organized by human agents to produce stable exchanges during interactions, including ways to locate argument in space and time with at least passive facilitation (e.g., scientific journals, courtrooms, theaters). Stable interactions serve as a template that self-organizes society, but society does not evolve as long as structures produce only stable interactions, characterized by low E uncertainty; that is,
All types of argument are located along a continuum, from competition to informal and formal argument to open conflict; for example, a debate between a missionary and a native may not serve the larger community, but it can serve their respective groups. Whether it serves the larger community hinges on whether the groups can reach compromise acceptable to them and the larger community. Compromise, made necessary by competition and argumentation, evolves new structures with the solution of IDPs (i.e., "creative destruction") (Schumpeter, 1989) , whereas war is the destruction of structure.
Assume that the strongest reason is the cash value of arguments that exemplifies Kuhn's observation that contacts between concepts and reality are rare, providing a practical social function that gains evolutionary momentum by generating adaptive differences between social units; assume that reasons are composed of one fraction in service of myths (ideology) and a practical fraction that attempts to solve an IDP by making contact with reality, R.
Violence loses favor for its participants in the larger communities, yet it draws attention to the issues that produce violence. The self-organized structures that arise under democracies reduce violence, but when it persists, the existence of stable structures or social units to manage the interaction is weakened or precluded (from Coase, 1937) . In command economies (e.g., Cuba), violence is harnessed to control money and administrative power, but this 444 SOCIAL SCIENCE COMPUTER REVIEW threatens the structures that can solve IDPs, including science, possibly weakening democracy or causing it to fail (e.g., Zimbabwe today and Germany in 1933).
All human interactions produce differences. Although structures minimize differences, differences exist as news (negative feedback), and news acts to employ or modify existing structures such as courts, politics, or science to resolve differences. Differences as I signal adaptive opportunities (e.g., conflict signals social differences, price signals market differences, and politics signal legal differences), adaptations process I (e.g., stock markets and universities reduce uncertainties), and the evolution of structures or K comes from the resolution of differences, characterized by low emotion states (∆E ≥ 0) and trust (Lawless, 2001 (Lawless, , 2002a . Letting society self-organize around differences promotes competition and conflict but, if kept civil, also produces economic and political freedom, better health and science, and more technology and less corruption (Lawless & Castelao, 2001 ). Democracies do not experience famine (Sen, 1999 ). Yet as Benardete (2002) noted, the belief of ancient Greeks prevails that logic and not democracy is a superior means to solve IDPs and build trust (e.g., Worchel, 1999) .
There is more to the interaction than to seek low E uncertainty. To be successful, interactions must also increase the energy available (A) to participants or witnesses or both. Arguments in service of an in-group marshal A not by challenging orthodoxy but by promoting membership (e.g., from a 1998 public opinion strategies poll, "Republicans, by 45% to 17%, think the Clintonesque movie 'Primary Colors'is more truth than fiction; Democrats, 40% to 23% think the opposite" [www.pos.org]); in contrast, argument in service of community functions to challenge existing ideology, acting as if in response to a "virtual knowledge" (Lawless, Castelao, & Ballas, 2000) and increasing the risks to in-groups but also opportunities to promote social efficiency and social evolution.
If I from social exchange conveyed by language marginally captures aspects of R (later Wittgenstein), whereas "truth" remains the reduction of information into meaning or knowledge (∆I ≥ 0, or K), the process is always imperfect, allowing truth to interact with ideology. Yet the logic of mathematics and science, and more broadly, human rationality, is motivated by a psychological need for closure (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1990) , forcing arguments to "converge" to a solution. For example, Campbell's (1996) multimethod model was designed to establish the existence of psychological phenomena through a convergence of multiple methods, a method that he later rejected because it marginalized incommensurable views. As Luce and Raiffa (1967) had already established, the individual rational perspective of traditional logic cannot capture the essence of the social. To achieve a mathematical model that captures the social requires an interdependence between action and witnessing that, it is hoped, also demonstrates that optimal decisions require that ideology be controlled (Lawless, Castelao, & Abubucker, 2000) .
The social community includes participants and witnesses engaged by argumentation, as well as those not as engaged. Evolutionary change from resolving differences before neutral participants seems to be a function of whether social outcomes emerge as positive feedback (new knowledge) or as a negative feedback that maintains the status quo. Tensions between these two feedbacks, the motivation to enhance self-interest, increasing E expenditures, and the desire for a convergence to low E states for constancy in society or culture will always exist (e.g., Lawless & Castelao, 2001) .
The key to understanding argumentation is that when self-interests become at risk, perspectives are transformed in the neutral in-between sphere into a shared vision-logic as a means to observe the rare Kuhnian contacts between concepts and R. These contacts become the strong reasons constructed by witnesses with less self-interest or ideology at risk; energy, E, expended by participants and facilitators to create an argument, enables more neutral witnesses to visualize possible rational solutions that jointly serve community (e.g., the arguments of Galileo and Aristotle, Newton and Descartes, or Einstein and Bohr), processing I into decisions and K that promote evolutionary change.
If action and observation are controlled by interdependent cognitive systems, with action, ∆a, and observational uncertainty, ∆I, then Bohr's interaction uncertainty relations become
Because c, the quantum of social action, is unknown, a solution requires boundary conditions; for example, as ∆I → 0, ∆a → ∞. The more certain the I derived from an interaction by an individual or group (e.g., ideology), the less I it has about its actions or those of others (e.g., Baumeister, 1995, pp. 51-97) , that is, akin to moving from illumination to illusion, an inversion of Plato's reasoning (belief in a single truth), but in line with the behavior of Socrates (argument to seek truth). For example, an experiment with air force combat pilots found that air combat performance was not associated with scores from a written examination of air combat maneuvers (Lawless, Castelao, & Ballas, 2000) . Similarly, Zajonc's (1998) review of emotion found that speakers are less aware than listeners of emotion conveyed, that correlations between autonomic nervous systems and subjective reports are weak, and that emotion from mere exposure of stimuli does not correlate with individual claims. Reversing boundary conditions for Equation 2 theoretically justifies argumentation, as ∆I → ∞, ∆a → 0; that is, the solution of IDPs occurs by bringing together incommensurable viewpoints before neutral observers to reduce the certainty in each belief, contradicting Nash (1950) that disagreement has zero negotiation value. A comparison of environmental remediation at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site in South Carolina versus its Hanford Site in Washington, and the citizen advisory boards at both sites, indicated that competition between opposing viewpoints not only led to better environmental decisions than cooperation under consensus rules to promote a single worldview but also produced more trust and liking (Lawless, Castelao, & Abubucker, 2000) .
Given that concepts or reasons exchanged during debate underdetermine reality, R, social differences drive concepts to align along in-group-out-group axes, which emotion crystallizes into a mixture of ideology and universal contacts with R (e.g., a deeply religious, highly skilled car mechanic), allowing groups to form into orthogonal clusters of influence. That is why argumentation increases I by momentarily neutralizing the strength of ideology across social units self-organized to engage in debate with their opponents, producing differences that promote evolution.
The solution of difficult problems is modeled by a double square well that represents a large group constituted of two polarized groups that argue before a third more neutral group that effectively makes the decision (see Figure 1) . The polarized elements constitute a barrier that must be overcome by the neutral members as the two polarized sides attempt to persuade the observers to subscribe to their view. Research indicates that the more divergent or orthogonal the views, the more emotion brought into play, and the more I processed by the neutral judges, if the emotion can be moderated (Lawless & Castelao, 2001) .
The double square well model represents an energy barrier between two groups, overcome in a democracy by compromise between the polarized groups or by one of the groups persuading the more neutral participants of the "correctness" of their belief. (A similar process is found with the purchase of consumer products: Each business has loyal followers, 446 SOCIAL SCIENCE COMPUTER REVIEW such as Sony and JVC or BMW and GM; to succeed, a company must retain its core of loyal consumers while appealing to the more neutral middle.)
THE PATH FORWARD AND SUMMARY
We expect to find something similar to Picard's (1997) liquid model of emotion (see Figure 2) . Dissonant I causes an oscillation in individual or social units that leads to a spectrum of vocal or neural E state changes partly observable as superpositions that resolve into constructive (solutions) or destructive interference (residual differences). As an example of constructive superposition in science, formal papers on retinal implants at their annual meeting increased from 2 in 1993 to 33 in 1999, helping to provide "the resolution required for blind patients to regain mobility" (Zrenner, 2002 (Zrenner, , p. 1025 ; an example of residual difference in science is the famous Einstein-Bohr disagreements on entanglement (Zeilinger, 1999) . Over time, E from reducing emotion drives local convergences that strengthen ideology, characterized by polarized clusters of in-groups. One goal for a computational science of evolution is to momentarily neutralize ideology (∆I → ∞) by increasing uncertainty while moderating emotion (Lawless, 2001) . A second goal is to test the strength of R contacts that remain (∆a → 0). Based on an idea from Kimura (1982) , we conclude that the differences that drive evolutionary change more likely arise from the solution of IDPs in areas neutral to ideology. Picard's (1997) liquid model of emotion suggests that individuals or groups exposed to dissonant I produce a spectrum of emotional displays. The vocal E part of this model has been confirmed in the laboratory for one participant (Lawless, 2002a) .
We also conclude that social influence cannot be captured in surveys of individual rational perspectives (Lawless, 2001) . To initiate an analytical SQM of groups, we compared repetitions of short phrases from a participant in regular and angry voice (similar to "beat about the bush") (see vocal ∆E in Figure 2 ). Pitch frequencies were consistent for either normal or angry voice (the average for normal voice was 127 Hz, with SD 5 Hz; for angry voice, 208 Hz, with SD 9 Hz). Speech samples were analyzed 100 at a time in sequence. Each pitch cycle was segmented to generate one overall spectral pattern for each uttered phrase, indicating a peak in the low-frequency region for normal voice but none for angry voice. On aver- age, pitch increased significantly for angry voice compared to normal, t(8) = 24.8, p < .000.
Research is planned with more participants and groups, as is a neurological study of ∆E (see the top part of Figure 2 ). Finally, although the theory of logical positivism values I and the resolution of dissonance, it has no mechanism to produce I, to process I, or to resolve dissonance except by achieving consensus through normative actions. And although extolling the normative virtues of cooperation (e.g., Axelrod, 1984) , logical positivist theory has failed to recognize its dangers: corruption, asymmetric I (e.g., spying), and social loafing (Lawless, 2002b) . These failures of positivism have allowed us to explore with SQM the role of argumentation in selforganization and social evolution. Broadly, in that command economies or bureaucracies suffer from a one-sided view of R (Hayek, 1944) , command decisions disrupt the self-organization inherent in trial-and-error processes. Democracies are freer to self-organize to solve IDPs, increasing the opportunities to fulfill self-interests. Self-organization spontaneously generates differences such as argument. But formal argument is a process that specifically applies tension between social clusters to disclose and process differences for the purpose of solving IDPs. Legal (Freer & Perdue, 1996) and economic justice (Friedman, 1982) and better science and physical health (Lawless & Castelao, 2001 ) emerge with the tension applied across a social system from the self-organized pursuit of self-interest. Based on SQM, we conclude that the degree of social tension characterizes self-organization and social evolution; we also conclude that this tension describes the entanglement between individuals that distinguishes between a group and an aggregation of the individuals who compose the group.
